CRIMINAL HOMICIDE (Discussed more fully in Bushrod I)
Homicide, the killing of one person by another, can be criminal or non-criminal. [It's the criminal ones that fascinate us. If you don't think so, take at look at FBI Famous Cases, Famous Trials, and the Crime Library.] Homicide crimes (1), (2) are the most common offenses in criminal law books and the most common crime included on law school exams in essay and objective questions. Your exam will involve one or more questions containing a criminal homicide. The reason is that homicide offenses contain all the classic elements of crime, e.g., mens rea, actus reus, causation and result. Homicides also may involve issues of provocation, justification and excuse. Suicide is not considered as equivalent to murder in American common law and is not punishable as a crime in any American jurisdiction. At English common law, suicide was a felony equivalent to murder. Read Dressler to get the full view. Here are a few tips that will be of use to you as you study the doctrine of criminal homicide.
The first issue to determine in a possible homicide vis a vis feticide is whether the victim was a human being. See the Discussion at Defining Death of a Human Being below. When does a person become a person for purposes of the criminal homicide statutes? At common law, a fetus not born alive is not considered a human being; if it is born alive, it is a human being. The MPC takes a similar view in and so did Texas (Take special note of this change in Texas Penal Code.) until September of 2003 when the definition in Section 1.07 (26) TPC of "individual" was amended to mean "a human being who is alive, including an unborn child at every state of gestation from fertilization until birth." "Death" is now defined in Section 1.07 (49) TPC, thusly, "Death includes, for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive." Section 19.06 (1) and (2) TPC seems to make it clear that the provisions of Chapter 19 - Criminal Homicide regarding the death of an unborn child do not apply if the conduct charged is "conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child" and " a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent, if the death of the unborn child was the intended result of the procedure." In addition, Chapter 19 does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the conduct charged was " a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent as part of an assisted reproduction as defined by Section 160.102 Family Code" or " the dispensation of a drug in accordance with law or administration of a drug prescribed in accordance with law." Thus, Texas has gone dramatically beyond the growing list of jurisdictions with feticide statutes. The Texas statute clearly treats the fetus - defined in Webster's dictionary as "a developing human, usually three months after conception to birth," as as an individual. But it also treats the embryo, defined by Webster's as "the developing human individual from the time of implantation to the end of the eighth week after conception," as an individual for purposes of the criminal homicide statutes. In fact, the fertilized egg traveling down the fallopian tubes prior to implantation in the wall of the uterus would seem to be viewed as an individual protected by Chapter 19. However, destroying embryos that have not ever been implanted into the mother would not be criminal homicide because Art. 38.40 CCP provides, "In a prosecution for the death of or injury to an individual who is an unborn child, the prosecution shall provide medical or other evidence that the mother of the individual was pregnant at the time of the offense." One can visualize scenarios in which embryos that are negligently, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally destroyed. What happens if an embryo was created in a petri dish during an effort to assist reproduction of a married couple, but prior to implantation the male donor (father) requests that the embryo be destroyed but the female donor (mother) wants to have the embryo implanted. One thing is for sure, if the embryo is destroyed before being transplanted into the woman, there can be no prosecution for criminal homicide or injury to a child becase they will be no proof that the female was pregnant with the embryo sat the time fo the destruction. Things can get sticky in the civil arena. Suppose there is a written agreement between the husband and the wife that specifies that the frozen embryo is to be destroyed in the event of divorce. A divorce occurs. Who owns the embryo? See Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet filed).
Re whether the victim was a person, the more accepted view at c/l was that if a fetus was born alive but died as a result of injuries suffered en utero, it was a person for purposes of the criminal homicide law. Prior to the enactment of the sweeping Texas Penal Code expansion of the definition of an individual, this was the approach taken in Texas prior to the sweeping change in definition of an individual. See Cuellar v. State, 957 SW2d 134 (Tex. App - Corpus Christi 1997). The ambit of risk for the applicability of strict liability homicide statutes, e.g, felony murder, intoxication manslaughter has expanded significantly with the expanded definition of an "individual." For example, it would now appear that responsibility for the strict liability offense of intoxication manslaughter, a second degree felony under Section 49.08 TPC, could apply in cases where a one day old embryo miscarried as a result of the intoxication of motor vehicle driver. What if it is a one car accident and the mother is the driver?
The next issue to determine in a homicide case is the voluntary act issue, i.e., was the killing the result of a voluntary act?
Next, ask yourself, "Was the killing an omission, i.e., was there a failure to stop the death from occurring?" Did the omission (failure to act) violate a legal duty of action?"
Next, consider the issue : "When is a person dead?' This can be a very important issue as to causation. At c/l , when a person stopped breathing and his heart stopped, he was dead; in more modern days, many statutes (including those of Texas) provide for "brain death" of the whole brain (a flat encephalogram or brain wave pattern) as the definition of death of a person who is on a respirator or other artificial life support. Be careful to know that the person at the end of life was alive when the actus reus occurred, e.g., when the doctor turns off the life support of a "brain dead" person (s)he is not guilty of murder in Texas because of our definition of death. But under the common law definition of death, the doctor would be guilty of causing the death of a person who had a cardiac and respiratory function because that individual would still be considered a person for purposes of criminal homicide.
Dates of injury and death may be important under common law. The common law year and a day rule said that a death that occurred more than a year and a day after the assaultive act that caused the death could not be a criminal homicide. This was an arbitrary rule of causation and in many jurisdictions the rule has been abandoned/abolished (Texas & MPC) or expanded to a larger number of years.
Mens rea of murder - At common law, the definition of the crime of murder required that one person kill another with "malice aforethought." [Note: The MPC, See Article 210, Section 210.2 MPC, and Texas, See Chapter 19, Section 19.02 TPC, do not expressly define murder in terms of "malice aforethought"; the descriptive state of mind "malice aforethought" is not used in either body of law. The MPC defines murder in terms of acting purposely or knowingly or recklessly with extreme indifference to the value of human life; the extreme recklessless form of MPC murder might be compared to the concept of common law "depraved heart/mind" murder. Texas defines murder in terms of acting intentionally or knowingly or intentionally inflicting serious bodily injury which causes death. Also, both the MPC and the TPC contain modified felony-murder rules, each of which differs from the other and from the c/l F/M rule.] At common law, there were no degrees of murder. All murder carried the same penalty, death.
"Aforethought" - In terms of modern American law, the word "aforethought" is a superfluous modifier. It just means that the malice has come before the killing and not after the killing was accomplished. In early common law it briefly had a meaning somewhat similar to premeditation, but that connotation was abandoned as the law of murder evolved.
"Malice" - In the modern context, this is a somewhat complex technical legal term that encompasses four (4) states of human endangering culpable mental attitudes, namely:
- Intent to kill, including what we consider as acting knowingly under the TPC and MPC.
- Intent to inflict grievous (what we in Texas,see Section 1.07 TPC, call "serious") bodily injury that causes the injured person's death. [Jurisdictions differ in the way they define grievous bodily injury. See Texas' definitions of "bodily injury" and "serious bodily injury" in Section 1.07 TPC.] In these scenarios, there may be causation issues when you have intervening medical neglect, e.g., a doctor or nurse negligently or recklessly treats the seriously injured victim in a manner that plays a part in the death.
- Depraved heart (abandoned and malicious heart, depraved mind) is a culpable state of mind characterized by an "I don't give a flip, throw all caution and concern for human safety to the wind, screw it" attitude of extreme (or gross or aggravated) recklessness in which one acts in utter disregard of human life, e.g., firing a gun into a crowded room to see the people panic, talking on a cell phone to one's coke supplier while going 110 mph in a drag race through a school zone crosswalk as tiny children leave the school, dropping a 50 lbs. concrete block from an overpass onto oncoming freeway traffic to watch the cars pile up, shooting an arrow straight up over a crowded beach to see where it will land, driving a motorboat at full speed through a group of swimmers as a shortcut to get a refreshing beer at a lakeside tavern, shooting into a passing passenger train to scare the passengers, etc. The concept of a depraved heart or mind, indifferent to the value of human life, is not always an easy one for a modern jury to comprehend. This form of malice aforethought doesn't connote the existence of any clinical mental disorder The aggravating element that distinguishes depraved heart malice aforethought from ordinary recklessness is defined in some depraved heart jurisdictions as the existence of circumstances which evince utter disregard for human life, i.e., complete lack of concern. Note that Section 210.2 (1) (b) MPC provides that criminal homicide constitutes murder when "it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." Note that Texas has no "depraved heart" or "extreme indifference to the value of human life" murder. See Section 19.02 TPC. Finally, on the question of whether depraved heart is unconstitutionally vague, recall that the USSC in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993), rejected a challenge to the Idaho capital punishment statute that uses "utter disregard for human life" as an aggravating factor.
- Felony murder - The felony murder rule (FM) in its pure form says that it is murder if a person is committing a felony and someone dies during the attempt to commit or commission of the felony, irrespective of whether the death is foreseeable or not. Immediate flight or escape from commission of the felony is treated as part of the felony. It makes no difference whether the death is caused accidentally, negligently, recklessly, purposefully, or intentionally. This is an example of strict liability in its most extreme form insofar as severity of punishment is concerned. (Note: Think of the first assignment's Faulkner case involving the seaman who sets fire to the boat while committing the c/l felony of larceny of rum, and simply add to it the additional fact that someone is burned to death by the ensuing fire; the death of that someone would be a good example of c/l felony murder.) One big question in felony murder cases is: "Why hold the felon guilty of murder when the death occurs in a completely fortuitous or accidental way?" The reason sometimes given is that the FM rule is designed to encourage felons to commit their felonies without unnecessary violence that increases the risk to human life, i.e., the felon who wishes to avoid the FM rule will commit her felonies is a safe manner. Many law school teachers believe that this doesn't work and that to treat such a person as a murderer is disproportionate punishment. So, we see a history of some courts limiting the scope of the FM rule. The two most important limitations of the FM rule are probably: (1) In many jurisdictions, the felony must be a "dangerous" felony. It depends on how one defines "dangerous." The word dangerous might mean a felony that carries a substantial likelihood (high probability) of death or serious bodily injury. In determining this issue, a court could look at the crime in the abstract or it might decide that it is better to look at the crime applied in the particular case; [Note: The Texas FM rule applies to all felonies, but the actor has to commit an act that is clearly dangerous to human life. Is this a better approach than the CA. approach evinced by the Patterson case in Johnson?] (2) Merger or the "Independent Felony Doctrine" is a way of limiting the FM rule. Suppose the underlying felony is a crime of violence, e.g., as assault. If the underlying crime is a crime of violence such as assault, the merger theory is that that felony cannot be the underlying felony for purposes of the FM rule because it, the underlying felony, merges into the completed crime, i.e., the unlawful killing. The idea is that the purpose of the FM rule is to deter felons from acting in a way that creates violent harm. To illustrate the concept of merger, one might ask whether robbery would be an independent felony that would merge into the killing. Robbery is a crime that involves as element of assault in the sense that it involves a robber who relies on force or threat of force to obtain property. However, robbery would not merge into the killing; it would be an independent felony because it has an independent felonious purpose, i.e., to deprive an individual victim of his property, separate and apart from its violent assault aspect. (Texas has an extremely liberal FM rule insofar as merger is concerned. See Johnson v. State, 4 SW3d 254 (Tex. Crim. App.1999) and Lawson v. State, SW3d (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); only a few states refuse to acknowledge the merger or independent felony doctrine; most hold that an underlying felony assault would merge; perhaps, the Texas Legislature will eventually wise up and restrict what will qualify as the underlying felony for purposes of felony murder.) HYPO: Suppose that A commits an armed robbery and, during the commission of the robbery, the person being robbed, V, is accidentally killed. Could this be FM in Texas? Under what circumstances? Could this be capital murder in Texas? Could this be FM under the MPC? The c/l? Could this be a first degree murder in jurisdictions like CA that recognize degrees of murder (see p.166 of Johnson)? You will find an excellent discussion of FM in Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward A Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 American Criminal Law Review 73 (1991).
Important: Each of the previous four types of states of mind qualifies as "malice aforethought" under the common law which defined murder as the killing of one person by another with malice aforethought!!!
Statutory Degrees Murder - Remember, at common law there were no degrees of murder. The same might also be said in a technical way for Texas and the Model Penal Code, but each of them do recognize the existence of a type of a special aggravated murder, e.g., capital murder, Section 19.03 TPC., in Texas, that alone is deserving of the death penalty. In Texas, capital murder is not assigned a degree. It's simply capital murder and carries either life or death depending on whether the prosectuiion is seeking the death penalty and how the jury answers the special issues under Article 37.071 CCP. The highest felony degree range of punishment in Texas is the first degree felony which carries imprisonment from 5 to 99 or life.
Many states recognized long ago that the old common law way of dealing with murder, i.e., death for all convicted murderers was too harsh. So, some states, beginning with Pennsylvania, divided murder into two and sometimes more (I believe PA. presently has three degrees of murder.) separate degrees of the crime of murder. Each of these separate statutory degrees of murder is a separate crime with its own definitional structure. In the degrees of murder jurisdictions, first degree murder typically carries life or death as the only possible punishments (much like Texas capital murder). Every state with degrees of murder has its own particular statutes to define the various degrees of murder. So, you have to go to the particular statutes to determine the elementary composition of the crime. You can do this, for example, by going to the California degrees of murder statute on p. 166 of the Johnson casebook and seeing the difference between first and second degree murder in California. Most state statutes typically incorporate three aggravating categories of homicide that constitute first degree murder. Here they are: (1) homicides committed by a particular manner or means such as lying-in-wait (assassination), poison (the way we kill killers) or torture (the skin 'em alive method would qualify); (2) homicides committed during the commission of certain named and potentially violent felonies; and/or (3) homicides committed with deliberate premeditation.
On the issue of premeditation and the wisdom of using it as a factor that single-handedly raises a 2nd degree murder to a first degree murder, there is considerable disagreement. Notice that Texas and the MPC do not utilize premeditation as an aggravating circumstance that will raise ordinary murder to capital murder. In many states that do use premeditation as an aggravating circumstance, the true meaning of premeditation as planning over a considerable period of time has been abandoned. In these states, the courts say that premeditation occurs if the actor simply thought about doing the killing before doing it. Thus, in these states an emotional killing done on the spur of the moment typically qualifies as a premeditated killing (first degree) killing.
You may wonder what is normally considered to be a second degree killing in a degrees of murder jurisdiction. Typically, all murders that do not qualify as first degree murders are lumped together as second degree murders. Since the common law did not recognize degrees of murder and/or premeditation, you should know what constitutes murder at common law in order to recognize what usually constitutes second degree murder in a degrees of murder jurisdiction.
[Mass murderers: As a matter of interest, we are told that mass murderers often display some of the following characteristics - they are typically male, reclusive, loners, aloof; from 30 -50 years of age, psychotic at the time of their homicidal conduct, with personality disorders, e,g,, narcissistic, paranoid, sociopathic, and/or schizoid; they often have aspirations that greatly exceed their grasp and tend to blame others (often inflicting the violence on their perceived nemeses) for their own individual failures; the homicides are premeditated and planned killings that display a conscious objective to kill and are usually precipitated by a perceived affront or insult; often the killings come without warning in that there is no antecedent violence or threat. In workplace killings, researchers tell us that the killer is often sullen, angry, depressed, inflexible, intimidating,and paranoid; the killer may be on a personal crusade, brittle at criticism, have a workplace grievance pending, discuss weapons, and/or feel mired in a hopeless situation.]
At common law manslaughter was an unlawful killing without malice aforethought; it was not separated into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Eventually, manslaughter morphed into three separate offenses, i.e., voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and misdemeanor-manslaughter.
Voluntary Manslaughter
What is the human but a bundle of passion? Voluntary manslaughter was an intentional killing with adequate provocation that was committed in a sudden heat of passion before there had been enough passage of time for the passion to subside (cool down). The sort of provocation that would be considered adequate was the sort of provocation that would trigger sudden passion (anger or emotion) in an ordinary man. The categories of adequate provocation that were recognized by the common law were few and narrow. What were the categories constituted adequate provocation at common law to reduce an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter? They included: (1) a man observing his wife in an act of adultery, (2) a battery where the person in the grip of sudden passion has been struck by the victim of the killing, (3) observation of the seduction of one's young daughter. With reference to adultery, at common law a confession of adultery by a party to it was not considered legally sufficient to constitute adequate provocation. Concerning the subsiding of the heat of passion, the intentional killing had to take place in the heat of passion, which required proof that not only was the accused in the grip of passion but that a reasonable person would not have "cooled down," i.e., that there had not been enough time for passion to subside in a reasonable person. If an intentional killing didn't qualify for voluntary manslaughter, it would typically be murder of the intent to kill variety of malice aforethought.
Today, many states allow words to raise the issue of adequate provocation and let the case go to the jury with both murder and manslaughter instructions. We saw examples of this in our casebook, e.g., the CA Berry case about the chef and the Israeli woman, Rachel. These states trust the trial judge to winnow out cases where the evidence simply doesn't raise the issue, but primarily entrusts the jury with the power and discretion to sort the provocation evidence out and decide whether to convict of manslaughter or murder.
The Texas Penal Code treats sudden passion procedurally as what may be best described as "mitigated murder." Rather than creating the crime of voluntary manslaughter, the TPC allows the defense at a murder trial to raise the issue of sudden passion arising from adequate cause at the punishment stage of the murder trial after the accused has been found guilty of murder. If the defense proves sudden passion arising from an adequate cause by a preponderance of the evidence, the punishment range for pen time is reduced from a first degree felony (a range anywhere from 5 years to 99 or life) to a second degree felony (a range anywhere from 2 years to 20 years). See Sections 19.01 and 19.02 TPC Thus, Texas does not have a crime known as voluntary manslaughter, though we accomplish the same purpose with our mitigated murder approach. Ask yourself, is the TPC approach, making this a punishment issue, more sophisticated than the c/l approach that creates the separate offense of voluntary manslaughter?
The MPC concept of sudden passion is broader and, perhaps, more sophisticated than the c/l or Texas concept; one way that one can commit the crime of manslaughter (there is no crime of voluntary manslaughter) under the MPC is to commit murder while the defendant subjectively is under an "extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse" (EED). Notice that the word "provocation" is not found in the MPC manslaughter statute. See Section 210.3 (1) (b) MPC. Notice, also, that there is no set time limit or cooling off period. Brooders are not excluded from the EED claim under the MPC. The triggering event is not limited to a laundry list. There is no requirement of an act of provocation. Words or taunts may be sufficient. The objective standard of reasonableness is decided from the subjective viewpoint of the accused.
Suppose a person, who is in the grip of a lawfully recognized heat of passion or extreme emotion disturbance (EED), kills someone other than the source of the provocation. Suppose that the victim is an innocent party, as when A, adequately provoked by B, kills C, an innocent bystander. Will A be allowed to raise the issue of adequate provocation? This issue is known as third party provocation. The early c/l held that the provocation had to come form the person killed, but the later c/l allowed it to come from a third party. The MPC does not limit the source of the extreme emotional disturbance. However, the TPC, Section 19.02(a)(2), indicates that the provocation must come from the person killed or someone acting with that person.
In a few states, there is a version of diminished mental capacity that reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter even though there is not any sudden emotional passion arising from an adequate cause, but rather a mental disturbance. You will see from your casebook reading that California recognized this aspect of diminished capacity at one time, but it no longer does. The MPC recognizes this form of diminished capacity for manslaughter in criminal homicide cases when it uses the words "extreme mental ...disturbance" (EMD) in Section 210.3 (1) (b) MPC.
Note: With regard to sudden passion or extreme emotional disturbance (EED), it is only in the case of killings that we reduce or mitigate the killer's responsibility. If A, adequately provoked by B, breaks B's arm, provocation or EED is legally irrelevant in charging A with assault.
Hint: Provocation or EED as mitigating factors are often seen in real life cases as fall-back or backup positions from a claim of self-defense.
Involuntary Manslaughter Defined
At common law, involuntary and voluntary manslaughter were punished the same. But, today all states that have voluntary and involuntary manslaughter punish involuntary manslaughter with a lesser punishment range than voluntary manslaughter. There are two kinds of involuntary manslaughter at common law, namely: (1) Killings that occur as a result of gross criminal negligence, and (2) Misdemeanor - Manslaughter killings which occur when an unintended homicide takes place during an unlawful act not amounting to a felony.[Note that the TPC and MPC do not recognize the misdemeanor-manslaughter rule.]
Note: The MPC , Section 210.3 and TPC, Section 19.04 have a single crime known as manslaughter. Under either statute, a reckless culpable mental state suffices for manslaughter. For recklessness, one needs to have a subjective perception and a consequent disregard of a known substantial and unjustifiable risk. Under the MPC, remember that when the subjective disregard of the substantial risk reflects extreme indifference to the value of human life, (what you might think of as a sort of MPC version of c/l "depraved heart") you will be dealing with murder not reckless manslaughter.
Criminally Negligent Homicide Defined
Concerning negligence, both the MPC, Section 210.4, and the TPC, Section 19.05 , have an additional homicide crime known respectively as "negligent homicide" (MPC) and "criminally negligent homicide" (TPC) in which the culpable mental state is gross (as opposed to "ordinary civil tort negligence") negligence.
In cases where there is a failure to perceive the risk, you will be looking for gross negligence in the sense of a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise. Texas also has a strict liability crime known as intoxication manslaughter in Section 49.08 TPC for drunk drivers who by reason of their intoxication kill another person. [Note: Unlike a state such as WA. that utilizes ordinary tort negligence as the operative culpable mental state for it's involuntary manslaughter law (Remember the Williams case of the young Indian boy who did of the gangrenous mouth infection and whose father was convicted of manslaughter for ordinary, as opposed to gross, negligence), the TPC and MPC both require a showing of gross negligence for negligent homicide; in fact, neither recognizes ordinary negligence in the short list of culpable mental states.]
Note: If you are a 1L (first year law student), you are probably getting used to the idea that many areas of law, in addition to the law of crimes and defenses, are governed by codes. As a lawyer, you will spend a lot of time in the next 40 years with your nose in a code of one sort or another. Since you are required in this course to spend considerable time in the Texas Penal Code (TPC), it may of some solace to know that a study of the penal codes of every state in the union to determine the "five best" and "five worst" found that (drum roll) the Texas Penal Code was the best in the nation. Skim this excellent article by Professor Paul Robinson, one of the top criminal law professors in the world, if you have time. It explains the purpose and function of a penal code, and it will provide you with greater appreciation of our TPC, notwithstanding the amendment savaging it typically takes when the Texas legislature is in session. .
DEFINING "DEATH OF A HUMAN BEING" - A REQUIRED RESULT IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE CASES & A POLICY QUESTION
When does life begin and end? When does a human being first become a person subject to being killed, and when does a human being cease being a person for purposes of the homicide statutes? One can see that the legal description of terms like "human being" or "individual" within the law of crimes is more than a simple Webster's definition. In many instances, the legal definition of a term is a reflection of core policy that has significant social implications and consequences.
The issue of